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1 Introduction
Efficiency and flexibility are the fundamental elements in the labor market in order to guarantee
an effective use of resources. Therefore, markets need to provide conditions, which allow the
exchange of workers in a well-organized fashion without incurring substantial costs. Efficient
labor markets should bring out the clear relationship between the workers’ incentives and their
efforts (Competitividad, 2012). The informal sector – under which we usually understand jobs
carried out in dubious environments, typically characterized by low productivity, minimal remu-
neration levels, and hardly any social security – quite possibly poses one of the biggest threats
in today’s world, especially in the developing economies and the poorest nations on earth. In
order to implement political and social policies addressing these issues, it is worthwhile to be as
precise as possible in assessing and quantifying the informal sector in its complexity, taking into
account the different positions on the topic.
In fact, the respective literature suggests measuring the informal sector quantitatively (e.g.
workers per company) as well as qualitatively (e.g. legal registration of the company in corre-
sponding cases). Thus, one faces situations in which measuring informality does not always lead
to a definite consensus.
Despite the lack of consensus, it is relatively clear that the informal sector is often associated with
working in small family-lead businesses or companies with less than ten workers, whose financial
conditions do not permit the delivery of adequate social security coverage (Perry and Saavedra-
Chanduvi (2007)). The definition accepted on the broadest level comes from the International
Labour Organization (ILO, 1972) in its employment program, which led to the development of
numerous labor market studies in developing countries in the early 1970s, later formalized by
Castells and Belton (1989). In particular, this program classifies productive activities (labours)
as part of the informal sector, which generate non-regulated income that ignore obligations such
as paying taxes, social security contributions, and complying with minimum wage regulations
(Pratap and Quintin, 2006, p. 3).
Further, Schneider and Enste (2000) address common guidelines in measuring the informal
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sector, specifically distinguishing between direct ways of measuring (supported by information
obtained from household and small business surveys) and indirect ways (founded in monitoring
macroeconomic variables – such as output gaps characterizing business cycles – and econometric
modeling techniques)1. In averaging various ways of measuring, they conclude the magnitude of
the informal sector to vary between 8 and 23 percent in advanced economies, yet the estimated
range in developing nations ranges between 23 and 60 percent.
In fact, Colombia provides a good example for a developing country with a sizeable informal
sector. The percentage of workers in the informal sector across its 13 biggest cities (measured
by the amount of informal employees as a fraction of the entire employed labor force) reaches 62
percent after the recession in the late 1990s, after fluctuating around an average of 55 percent
throughout the entire decade. Subsequently, these values are only slightly lower and remain
around 56 percent in 2008 and increase again in 2009 towards a considerable 56.2 percent,
therefore surpassing the regional average (Cre´dito Pu´blico, 2011)2. But, Hamann and Mej´ıa
(2011) confirms, the majority of empirical studies in Colombia suggest that the high degree of
informality (in context of the labor market as well as in business), measured as non-reported
and non-regulated employment, fluctuates around 60 and 75 percent. It is important to note
that business sector informality is based on company size and legal registration. Of course,
this scenario calls for the implementation of institutional measures if one wants to address the
problem.
This article explores the relationship between informal employment, income distribution, and
tax policy from the perspective of a Dynamic Stochastic Equilibrium Model (DSGE), represent-
ing a simplified version of the Colombian economy. We consider two distinct types of households:
(i) households in the upper half of income, characterized by their access to the financial sector
1Regarding the information obtained through direct home surveys it is necessary to clarify the following: It is
a valuable expression for determining the level of informality in a country (through positions on non-compliance
with the law regarding employee benefits, tax statements on tax issues, and accessibility to the financial sector,
which can be one of the key determinants of informality). However, the subjective nature of the answers given to
the questionnaire cannot be ignored, in which case the measurement of the problem can be imprecise
2In the informal employment considered here, we find private employees, workers in small establishments
employing no more than five people including the employer or partner, family workers receiving no remuneration,
workers in businesses not receiving income in other households, domestic employees, day laborers, self-employed
people working in small companies with under five employees. Further, this definition does not contain independent
professionals, employers in small companies with up to five workers, and government employees.
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and the capacity to accumulate capital and (ii) households in the lower half of income, which
are described by liquidity constraints owed to their limited credit access. The model (a) ex-
plores the effect of various types of taxes and contributions on informality, and (b) analyzes the
consequences of tax burden and subsidy schemes on income distribution. The article proceeds
with a brief review of the respective literature in section two and a thorough presentation of the
DSGE model of the real economy in section three. Section four contains our simulations and
section five concludes.
Our main contribution with this paper is based on the ability to view which of the instruments
of fiscal policy is more effective in reducing informality levels of middle-income countries and
propose tools to reduce this problem with lower costs on welfare.
2 The Various Links of Informality
There exists an extensive literature on informality, which establishes various relationships, such
as its connection to poverty, productivity, or external shocks. For instance, the seminal works
of Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996), and Haan and Watson (2000) introduce the concept of an
equilibrium unemployment rate in real-business-cycle models in a general way. Further, there
exists a strand of literature incorporating labor market frictions into dynamics of inflation, such
as Walsh (2005), Krause and Lubik (2007), and Christoffel and Linzert (2010) among others.
In the connection between informality and poverty, Age´nor and Dc (2003) uses the Mini-
Integrated Macroeconomic Model for Poverty Analysis (IMMPA), developed by Age´nor, Izquierdo,
and Fofack (2003). Age´nor, Fernandes, Haddad, and van der Mensbrugghe (2003)3evaluate the
effects of fiscal policy and labor market reforms on employment and poverty, concluding that the
effect of these policies depends on how they are financed4. However, Alm and Lo´pez (2002) use
3Cited by Age´nor and Dc (2003).
4Policies directed towards the reduction of unemployment can lead to an increase in poverty if the fiscal
restrictions impose changes in funding. For instance, compensation in terms of a reduction of transfer payments
have negative effects on the poor. Taxes on consumption can have negative effects on the consumption basket of
the poor, reducing real income. A reduction of government spending on infrastructure can have harmful effects
on global productivity and further an indirect negative impact on private investment levels.
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a computable General Equilibrium Model (static) to reach a different conclusion: a reduction
of nine percentage points of tax-related variables generates a decrease of one percent in the
informal sector labor market and an increase of three percent in the formal sector labor market,
which seems to be more in line with observations in reality.
Another area, which has received attention in this context, is the connection between external
shocks and the labor market. Specifically, Cook (2005) considers the effect of financial crises on
the informal sector, using a DSGE model incorporating search and matching. They find that an
external shock to the financial sector can lead to a reallocation from the formal towards the in-
formal sector labor force, in particular towards low-productivity sectors, such as the agricultural
sector. In this argument, the external shock on interest rates drives a reduction in the income
gap between the agricultural sector and urban workers, particularly for Indonesia. However,
Gertler, Gilchrist, and Natalucci (2003) and Meza and Quint´ın (2005)5argue that the lowered
use of factors mostly explains the decrease in labor productivity levels during financial crises in
emerging markets.
With respect to developing countries and their relationship to institutions, one may look at the
work by Ulyssea (2010) about Brazil, analyzing the effect of various labor market institutions
and entry regulations prevailing in the formal sector on the size of the informal sector. The
results indicate that the best approach to reduce the size of the informal sector is adopting
policies, which reduce the costs of being formal and create the right incentives for companies
and workers intending to switch to the formal sector.
On the other hand, raising the costs of being informal reduces informality. This fact is consistent
with the findings from Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012), who use a DSGE model for Brazil. They
employ a labor market split in two sectors with search and matching, where firms decide whether
to hire their labor force formally or informally. In this framework, they analyze the effects of
changes in public policies on employment and the role of informality in the Brazilian economy.
Their findings suggest that the effect of government intervention on the labor market depends on
the magnitude of worker reallocation in both the formal and informal sectors. Policies lowering
5Cited by Cook (2005)
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the costs of formality or raising the costs of informality increase the participation rate in the
formal sector, while reducing unemployment6. This fact is corroborated by Satchi and Temple
(2009), who suggest that labor market institutions can have substantial effects in countries with
medium incomes, but the effects may not be the same in poorer countries, where a more complex
approach might be more likely to succeed.
In the case of Colombia, a country with a medium average income according to the World Bank,
Hamann and Mej´ıa (2011) uses a DSGE model to analyze the effect of policies on informality.
The remainder of this paper will address this approach, as our exercises concern impact eval-
uation of increasing transfer payments to constrained households, financed by adjustments in
other variables: public spending, taxes on capital, taxes on labor, social security payments, or
tariffs. We aim to determine the efficiency of the above transfers, while assessing the impact of
the tax instruments available to the government. To this end, we define two main variables: the
share of households with constrained income in the total amount of households (a redistributive
indicator) and the percentage of informality in the economy (an indicator of efficiency for the
use of resources). The various alternatives are evaluated in terms of these variables, in order to
determine their efficiency.
3 The model
Our model considers two distinct types of households: (1) households with access to credit and
financial markets (optimizing households) and (2) liquidity constrained households (restricted
households). Having an endowment of skilled and unskilled labor, each household maximizes its
utility in deciding over the optimal supply of labor (the first group in an intertemporal context
and the latter group makes its decision for the current period).
6A decrease in hiring costs or in taxes on labor income raise the size of the formal sector.
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3.1 Optimizing Households
The decision faced by a representative optimizing household will be to maximize the future
expected value of its utility over time:
Max Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
Lt
L0
(lncot + ψocln (ppoct − noct) + ψoncln (pponct − nonct)) , (1)
subject to
(1 − τk) rtkt−1
θ
+ (1 − τt) (woctnoct + wonctnonct) + ertft = potcot + pftit, (2)
where cot stand for optimizing household consumption, ppoct and pponct are fraction of skilled
and non-skilled agents, noct and nonct are employment of skilled and non-skilled, rt is return
of capital, kt−1 is capital, woct and wonct are wage of skilled and non-skilled, ert is nominal
exchange rate, ft is external remittances, pot is price of optimizing household consumption, pft
is price of formal products, it is investment, τk and τt are the level of taxes on capital and labor.
The parameters β, θ, ψoc, and ψonc, the household’s discount factor, the population’s growth
rate, and the utility weight of leisure of skilled and non-skilled labor. Moreover, with δ being
the rate of depreciation, capital evolves over time in the following way:
kt = (1 − δ) kt−1
θ
+ it. (3)
The labor market for skilled group of consumers is determined by7:
cot
ppoc− noct =
(1 − τt)woct
ψocpot
. (4)
The labor market for the unskilled group is determined by:
cot
pponc− nonct =
(1 − τt)wonct
ψoncpot
. (5)
7Lowercase letters refer to relative prices, expressed in terms of P .
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Further, the Euler equation is:
Et (cot+1)
cot
= Et
(
β
pft+1
pft
pot
pot+1
(
(1 − τk) rt+1
pyt+1
+ 1 − δ
))
. (6)
The budget constraint can be expressed as:
(1 − τk) rtkt−1
θ
+(1 − τt) (woctnoct + wonctnonct)+ertft−potcot−pft
(
kt − (1 − δ) kt−1
θ
)
= 0
(7)
and the dynamics of capital become:
kt = (1 − δ) kt−1
θ
+ it. (8)
3.2 Households Facing Liquidity Constraints
The decision for the second group of households will be to maximize its utility function at time
t:
Maxcr,nrc,nrbc U = lncrt + ψrcln (pprc− nrct) + ψrncln (pprnc− nrnct) , (9)
subject to
wrctnrct + wrnctnenct + transrt = prT crt, (10)
where crt is liquidity constrained household consumption, pprct and pprnct are fraction of agents
skilled and non-skilled, nrct and nrnct are employment of skilled and non-skilled, wrct and wrnct
are wage of skilled and non-skilled, transrt are transfers given by the government, and prt is the
price of liquidity constrained household consumption. Parameters ψoc and ψonc are the utility
weight of leisure of skilled and non-skilled.
The labor market is determined by:
crt
pprc− nrct =
wrct
ψrcprt
, (11)
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crt
pprnc− nrnct =
wrnct
ψrncprt
, (12)
and the budget constraint:
wrctnrct + wrnctnrnct + transrt = prtcrt. (13)
3.3 Formality vs. Informality Decision of Non-Skilled Labor
While skilled agents only participate in the formal sector, non-skilled workers have to decide
whether to offer their labor in the formal or informal sector. Assuming that households max-
imize their income subject to the substitution constraint, we model this decision with a CET
utility function. Following the Harris-Todaro model, we assume worker’s decision to be on their
expected income, which depends, in the formal market, on wage and the probability of being
employed. Thus, non-skilled workers choose between joining the formal market (a market with
unemployment and a limited chance of being hired) and the informal market, where they can
be employed, according to the equilibrium price in this market. Optimizing households offer
non-skilled labor according to:
nonct = (noncft + uot) + noncit, (14)
where the term in brakets is the participation in the formal market, noncft are non-skilled
workers in the formal market, uot is unemployment, and noncit are non-skilled workers in the
informal market. For optimizing households, their path of expansion and aggregation status
condition are:
noncft + uot
noncit
=
(
probeot
woncft
woncit
1 − ωo
ωo
)−σo
, (15)
wonctnonct = woncftnoncft + woncitnoncit, (16)
where probeot is the probability of being hired, woncft and woncit are wages earned in formal
and informal markets. Parameters ωo and σo are, respectively, the utility weight of formal
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market and elasticity of substitution. Formal wage evolves over time in the following way:
woncft = woncft−1, (17)
and the probability of being hired in the formal market is determined by:
probeot =
noncft
noncft + uot
. (18)
The respective functions for households facing liquidity constraints are
nrnct = (nonrft + urt) + nrncit, (19)
nrncft + urt
nrncit
=
(
probert
wrncft
wrncit
1 − ωr
ωr
)−σr
, (20)
wrnctnonct = wrncftnrncft + wrncitnrncit, (21)
wrncft = wrncft−1, (22)
and
probert =
nrncft
nrncft + urt
, (23)
where nrncft are non-skilled workers in the formal market, nrncit are non-skilled workers in
the informal market, urt is unemployment, probert is the probability of being hired, woncft and
woncit are wages earned in formal and informal markets. Parameters ω and σ are, respectively,
the utility weight of formal market and elasticity of substitution.
3.4 Aggregating Household Consumption
Aggregated consumption by the optimizing households is composed of consumption goods in the
formal and the informal sector. The aggregation of all goods is represented by a CES function,
given the substitutability between both types of consumption. As a result, we find the following
relationships:
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cot = Bco
(
ωcocof
σco−1
σco
t + (1 − ωco) coi
σco−1
σco
t
) σco
σco−1
, (24)
coft
coit
=
(
pft
pit
1 − ωco
ωco
)−σco
, (25)
and
potcot = pftcoft + pitcoit. (26)
coft and coit are consumption in the formal and the informal sector. pft and pit are their
respective prices. Bco is a scale parameter, ωco is the utility weight of formal market and σco is
the elasticity of substitution. For the constrained households, the respective equations become:
crt = Bcr
(
ωcrcrf
σcr−1
σcr
t + (1 − ωcr) cri
σcr−1
σcr
t
) σcr
σcr−1
, (27)
crft
crit
=
(
pft
pit
1 − ωcr
ωcr
)−σcr
, (28)
and
prtcrt = pytcrft + pitcrit. (29)
3.5 Production
Following the work of Vasco and Yang (2010), we consider two sectors -the formal and the
informal- producing different types of goods, which are sold at different prices. While the formal
sector employs capital as a factor of production, the informal sector does not.
3.5.1 The Formal Sector
For the formal sector, we assume a production function with three distinct features: First, labor
and capital are aggregated by a Cobb-Douglas function. Second, skilled and unskilled labor
combine in a CES-type function. Third, skilled and unskilled labor aggregate, coming from
both household types. Essentially, this means that labor from both types of households are
not perfect substitutes (which may be explained by differences in education or alimentation, for
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instance). With respect to our first feature, production states:
Y Ft = K
α
t−1 (zftLtnft)
1−α , (30)
where Y Ft is production in the formal sector, Kt−1 is capital, nft is the work demanded, and zft
is the productivity. Parameter α is the weight of capital in the production function. Minimizing
costs with respect to Y leads to:
αKαt−1 (zftLtnft)
1−α =
rt
pyt
(31)
and
(1 − α)Kαt−1zf1−αt (Ltnft)−α =
wft
pyt
. (32)
Expressing the above equations in per capita terms, deflated by the IPC, gives:
αkα−1t−1 θ
1−α (zftnft)1−α =
rt
pyt
(33)
and
(1 − α) kαt−1θ−αzf1−αt nf−αt =
wft
pyt
. (34)
The production function in per capita terms becomes:
yft =
(
kt−1
θ
)α
(zftnft)
1−α . (35)
Aggregated labor in the formal sector consists of skilled and unskilled labor, combined in a
CES-type setting. Minimizing costs leads to the following equations:
nft = Bpf
(
ωpfnfc
σpf−1
σpf
t + (1 − ωpf )nfnc
σpf−1
σpf
t
) σpf
σpf−1
, (36)
nfct
nfnft
=
(
wfct
wfnct
1 − ωpf
ωpf
)σpf
, (37)
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and
wftnft = wfctnfct + wfnctwfnci. (38)
Bpf is a scale parameter, ωpf is the utility weight of skilled labor and σpf is the elasticity of
substitution. Skilled and unskilled work in the formal sector are the result of adding optimizing
and liquidity-constrained households. As noted before, both distinct types of labor are not
perfect substitutes. The distinction can be explained by various aspects, for instance differences
in training, education, or general living conditions (health, food, etc.). Companies minimize
labor costs of both skilled and unskilled labor, given the aggregation constraint of household
work. The resulting equations for labor in the formal sector then are:
nfct = Bfc
(
ωfcnoc
σfc−1
σfc
t + (1 − ωfc)nrc
σfc−1
σfc
t
) σfc
σfc−1
, (39)
noct
nrct
=
(
woct
wrct
1 − ωfc
ωfc
)−σfc
, (40)
wfctnfct (1 − τc) = woctnoct + wrctwrci, (41)
and for unskilled formal sector labor:
nfnct = Bfn
(
ωfnnoncf
σfn−1
σfn
t + (1 − ωfn)nrncf
σfn−1
σfn
t
) σfn
σfn−1
, (42)
noncft
nrncft
=
(
woncft
wrncft
1 − ωfn
ωfn
)−σfn
, (43)
and
wfnctnfnct (1 − τc) = woncftnoncft + wrncftwrncfi. (44)
Bfc and Bfn are scale parameters, ωfc and ωfn are, respectively, the utility weight of optimizing
households, whilst σfc and σfn are the elasticity of substitution of each function.
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3.5.2 The Informal Sector
We assume the production function in the informal sector (in per capita terms) to be:
yit = zitnit. (45)
The optimality condition becomes:
zit =
wit
pit
. (46)
Then, the equilibrium in the informal sector is given by:
yit = coit + crit. (47)
Now, informal work is also the aggregation (using a CES function) of informal labor from
optimizing and constrained households. The optimality conditions for both types of work are
summarized in the following equations:
nit = Bpi
(
ωpinonci
σpi−1
σpi
t + (1 − ωpi)nrnci
σpi−1
σpi
t
) σpi
σpi−1
, (48)
noncit
nrncit
=
(
woncit
wrncit
1 − ωpi
ωpi
)−σpi
, (49)
and
wfnctnfnct = woncftnoncft + wrncftwrncfi, (50)
where the parameters Bpi, ωpi and σpi are, respectively, a scale parameter, the utility weight of
optimizing household, and the elasticity of substitution.
3.6 International Trade
We assume the existence an international sector, catering to the demand for domestic and
imported goods. The demand for exports depends on foreign traders, who can purchase goods
from the domestic country or from other sources. Export supply is modeled based on the optimal
decision-making of entrepreneurs, who can channel their productive resources towards domestic
13
or international markets.
3.6.1 The Demand For Imports
Retailers minimize their spending, given that imported and domestic goods are not perfect
substitutes. Therefore, we model the aggregation of these assets by a CES function, and the
cost minimization process of retailers results in the following relationships:
coft + crft + gt + it = Bm
(
ωmm
σm−1
σm
t + (1 − ωm) d
σm−1
σm
t
) σm
σm−1
, (51)
mt
dt
=
(
pmt
pdt
1 − ωm
ωm
)−σm
, (52)
and
pft (coft + crft + gt + it) = (1 + iva) (pmtmt + pdtdi) . (53)
The domestic price of imports is given by:
pmt = pwmtert (1 + aran) , (54)
where gt is government spending, mt and pmt are imports and its price, dt and pdt are domestic
demand and its price, pwmt is the international price of imported goods, and ert is the nominal
exchange rate. Bm is a scale parameter, ωm is the utility weight of imported goods, σpi is the
elasticity of substitution, iva is a value added tax, and aran is an import tariff.
3.6.2 The Supply Of Exports
Input use determines the production possibility frontier of entrepreneurs, who can use their
goods for Exports or domestic sales. Given this production limit (which is modeled by a CET
function), entrepreneurs maximize their profit by choosing the optimal mix of exports and
domestic sales. The resulting equations are:
yft = Be
(
ωex
σe−1
σe
t + (1 − ωe) d
σe−1
σe
t
) σe
σe−1
, (55)
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xt
dt
=
(
pxt
pdt
1 − ωe
ωe
)−σe
, (56)
and
pftyft = (pxtxt + pdtdt) . (57)
The domestic price of exports then becomes:
pxt = pwxtert, (58)
where xt and pxt are exports and its price and pwxt is the international price of export goods. Be
is a scale parameter, ωe is the utility weight of exported goods, σe is the elasticity of substitution.
3.6.3 The Demand For Exports
The country’s exports are not perfect substitutes for goods of other origin. Thus, the inter-
national buyer minimizes his expenditure, given the CES aggregation function linking country
purchases and purchases from other suppliers. The equations governing this behavior are:
xtt = Bx
(
ωxx
σx−1
σx
t + (1 − ωx)xx
σx−1
σx
t
) σx
σx−1
, (59)
and
xt
xxt
=
(
pwxt
pwt
1 − ωx
ωx
)−σx
, (60)
where xxt and pwt are purchases from other suppliers and its price. Bx is a scale parameter, ωx
is the utility weight of country purchases, σx is the elasticity of substitution.
3.7 Closed Macroeconomy
Equality of savings and investment is guaranteed in the above approach, as savings mare are
equal to total investment in the economy. The government’s budgetary imbalance is financed
by external borrowing st and external interest rates rit:
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stert =
st−1
θ
ritert + pftgt + transrt − τk rtkt−1
θ
+ τt (woctnoct + wonctnonct)
+ τc (wfctnfct + wfnctnfnct) − ivapft (coft + crft + gt + it)
1 + iva
− aran (pwmtmtert) . (61)
As soon as the external market closes, the exchange rate adjusts to equalize Current and Capital
Account (balance of payments):8
walrast = pwxtxt + ft +
(
st − st−1
θ
rit
)
− pwmtmt. (62)
GDP is defined as:
gdpt = pft (coft + crft + gt + it) + pit (coit + crit) + pxtxt − pmtmt
1 + aran
. (63)
The government determines public spending in order to maintain a targeted debt level:
stert
gdpt
= target. (64)
The consumer price index (cpit) is defined as:
pft (coft + crft) + pit (coit + crit)
coft + crft + coit + crit
= cpit = 1. (65)
4 Simulations
In this paper, we postulate that the government needs to dedicate resources to constrained house-
holds in an attempt to generate income redistribution through appropriate policies; specifically,
the government aims to raise transfers to these households by 1 percent. From the perspective of
the steady-state equilibrium, we assume public finances to be in their long run equilibrium and
thus we neither consider the option of raising public debt nor printing money as an alternative
8Technically, this equation is redundant: the budgetary constraints of the remaining agents in the system and
the fact that markets are in equilibrium ensure this equation to remain balanced as well. However, it includes
the “Walras” variable to ensure compliance with this condition (known as Walras’ Law) in the system. Its value
must be zero at any point of time.
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to reducing the deficit. The latter element follows directly from not including monetary relations
in the model. Thus, in order to finance additional transfer payments, the government must cut
spending or increase revenue through the use of various taxes.
With this in mind, we initially consider four possible scenarios: an offsetting reduction in
public spending, increasing taxes on capital, raising taxes on labor, and an increase in social
security contributions by companies. Traditionally, these types of models consider shocks to
productivity, which leads us to include an additional option, in which the increased transfer
payments are financed by productivity of companies in the formal sector, as a point of comparison
to the previous scenarios. Our results are compared to findings from Alm and Lo´pez (2002),
Age´nor and Dc (2003),Ulyssea (2010), Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012), and Hamann and Mej´ıa
(2011), among others. Our simulations display the following relationships 9:
GDP and capital: financing transfer payments with higher taxes or lower government
spending yields a negative response in the behavior of both GDP and capital. As expected, the
increase in taxes on capital causes a collapse in capital used, but only in the formal sector of the
economy. Financing transfer payments with higher productivity on the other hand leads to an
increase of both aggregate production and capital, where the latter effect results from positive
changes in investment flows (see figure 1).
Companies: if financing occurs through taxes, the level of production diminishes in formal
sector companies – a result that Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012) focuses on. The situation is
comparable for informal sector companies, except for the case when financing happens through
an increase in social security contributions by the formal sector. This finding is consistent with
Ulyssea (2010).
Insert Figure:The Effects from Increased Transfer Payments on GDP and Capital.
Labor hired by companies displays a similar behavior, as it only increases in informal com-
panies when the source of funding is an increase in social security taxes. In this case the cost
9See appendix one and two about data calibration and parameters used.
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is borne by the formal sector, as opposed to improvements in productivity, in which case there
would be a positive effect through job creation in the formal sector (see figure 2).
Insert Figure:The Effects from Increased Transfer Payments on Companies
The total labor market:Within this framework, the employment rate falls with formal
companies hiring less after facing an increased tax burden. At the same time, households with
liquidity constraints (informals) decrease their participation rate as a consequence from higher
after-tax incomes. This fall in employment turns out to be greater in size than the newly cre-
ated employment, which in turn diminishes the unemployment rate among those households.
In this context, public handouts only create problems in the formal sector as the labor market
in the informal sector restructures itself with people becoming inactive after receiving transfer
payments. As for the utility-maximizing households (formal sector), both scenarios of financing
transfer payments with taxes on capital or on social security payments carry strong negative
effects. These results are in line from Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2012), who finds that govern-
ment interventions in the labor market generate a reallocation of workers across the formal and
informal sector (see figure 3).
Insert Figure:The Effects from Increased Transfer Payments on the Labor Market
Informality and distribution:The fall in the level of informal employment is related to a
relatively bigger job creation in the formal sector. Financing transfer payments by higher taxes
on labor would decrease informality, where the degree of informality of companies reflects the
relative size of production between sectors. However, the main consequence of the increase in
transfers is the improvement in income distribution, as households with restrictions are better
off (see figure 4).
Insert Figure:The Effects from Increased Transfer Payments on Informality and
Distribution
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5 Conclusions
The goal of this article is to evaluate the impact of fiscal instruments on two fundamental
characteristics of middle income countries, such as Colombia: the persistent income inequality
within the society and the substantial degree of informality.
Increased transfer payments to households with lower incomes, which in this case translates
to households facing liquidity constraints, have a positive effect on income distribution. However,
in order to finance these additional payments, one has to tolerate higher taxes or a reduction in
other areas of public spending – both measurements which have a negative effect on productivity
in the formal sector, on GDP, and on investment. In consequence, this translates to less total
income. Through this mechanism one achieves a better distribution of less wealth.
Financing transfers with increases in taxes either on social security contributions or on capital
translates to an increased degree of informality, whereas raising taxes on labor and a reduction
in public spending have the opposite effect. These results are similar to what we observe in the
unemployment rate, which increases when taxes on social security and capital are raised, but
drops when government spending is reduced or when taxes on labor are raised.
Finally, it is important to highlight the results from the scenario of an increase in productivity
in the formal sector. When the economy is capable of raising productivity, investment and formal
sector productivity rises, which in turn translates to higher growth, tax revenues, employment,
transfer payments, a lesser degree of informality, higher incomes, and a better income distribution
within the population.
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Appendix 1
Variables
noc 0.0832 nrncf 0.0612 d 6.4879
nonc 0.1798 nrnci 0.0853 pm 1.0000
co 5.0214 wrncf 4.5328 pd 1.0000
i 2.5194 wrnci 3.4430 x 1.6220
k 20.8164 cof 4.2240 px 1.0000
woc 23.5870 coi 0.7975 pwx 1.0000
wonc 8.7921 pf 1.0000 xx 162.2048
po 1.0000 pi 1.0000 s 2.6291
r 0.2037 crf 1.1681 gdp 10.1160
f 0.4879 cri 0.1960 ipc 1.0000
er 1.0000 yf 8.1099 employment 0.4009
nrc 0.0060 nf 0.2478 ginfn 0.3817
nrnc 0.1749 py 1.0000 ingo 7.5409
cr 1.3641 wf 15.8975 ingr 1.3641
wrc 4.2527 zf 12.2831 distr 0.1532
wrnc 3.2659 nfc 0.0892 transr 0.7674
pr 1.0000 nfnc 0.1586 τk 0.1245
noncf 0.0974 wfc 27.8997 τt 0.0401
nonci 0.0678 wfnc 9.1446 τc 0.2012
uo 0.0147 yi 0.9934 iva 0.1041
ur 0.0284 ni 0.1530 xt 163.8269
probeo 0.8690 wi 6.4922 walras 0.0000
prober 0.6833 zi 6.4922 aran 0.0547
woncf 9.0483 g 1.6394 ing 8.9050
wonci 10.3293 m 2.1626 ginfy 0.1091
Table 1: Source: Values are calculated from National Accounts and GEIH published by DANE,
Own Elaboration.
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Appendix 2
Parameters
β 0.9326 σco 1.5000 σm 1.4000
ppoc 0.1116 Bco 1.6613 Bm 2.0044
ψoc 0.1279 ωco 0.7524 ωm 0.3133
ψonc 0.2229 σcr 1.5000 aran0 0.0547
pponc 0.3124 Bcr 1.6267 pwm 0.9482
τk0 0.1245 ωcr 0.7668 σe -1.5000
τt0 0.0401 α 0.5142 Be 2.3263
τc0 0.2012 σpf 0.7000 ωe 0.7159
θ 1.0170 Bpf 2.2100 xt0 163.8269
δ 0.1061 ωpf 0.5729 pw 1.0000
ψrc 0.0216 σfc 0.7000 σx 1.5000
ψrnc 0.3887 Bfc 1.0941 Bx 1.1232
pprc 0.0129 ωfc 0.9958 ωx 0.0444
pprnc 0.3372 σfn 0.7000 target 0.2599
transr0 0.7674 Bfn 1.8057 ri 1.0400
σo -2.0000 ωfn 0.7947 f0 0.4879
g0 1.6394 σpi 0.7000 zf0 12.2831
ωo 0.3718 Bpi 2.1051 zi0 6.4922
σr -2.0000 ωpi 0.6836 ipc0 1.0000
ωr 0.4674 iva0 0.1041
Table 2: Source: Values are calculated from National Accounts and GEIH published by DANE,
Own Elaboration.
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